Zusammenfassung: Der Beitrag widmet sich den Anfängen rechtlicher Argumentation, die auf das römische Recht und, genauer, auf die republikanische Rechtswissenschaft zurückgehen� Ausgangspunkt ist die These von Stroux, dass das alte formalistische Paradigma in jener Zeit durch ein neueres verdrängt worden sei, in dem die Fairness eine prominente Rolle spielte, und dessen Begründung und Methode aus der griechischen Redekunst geschöpft worden sei� Neben Stroux steht Viehwegs Theorie einer topischen Jurisprudenz� Diese von Nichtjuristen formulierten Thesen werden konfrontiert mit der communis opinio doctorum, die von Schulz, Kaser und Wieacker repräsentiert wird� Es soll gezeigt werden, dass neuere Erkenntnisse in der Rechtstheorie eine nuanciertere Bewertung der Arbeiten von Stroux und Viehweg ermöglichen, die die Grundlagen der westlichen Rechtswissenschaft keineswegs in Frage stellen * )�
1� Introduction:
In his critique on legal education 1 ) Duncan Kennedy asserts that law teachers indoctrinate their students that there exists an analytical process, so-called thinking like a lawyer, which is taught to them so they can find the correct legal solution� Hans Ankum finds the relevance of Roman law in legal education in the fact that it teaches the students to think 2 ), which links legal * ) This work is based on the research supported wholly by the National Research Foundation of South Africa (Grant specific unique reference number UID 85777); the Grantholder acknowledges that opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in any publication generated by the NRF supported research are that of the author, and that the NRF accepts no liability whatsoever in this regard� 1 ) D � Kennedy, Legal education as training for hierarchy, in: D � Kairys (ed�), The Politics of Law, A Progressive Critique, New York 1982, 38-58� Kennedy also mentions that the students are taught a list of pro and contra arguments used by lawyers to argue whether a certain rule is applicable or not, but the punch line actually is that the teachers decide which arguments are valid in certain cases and vice versa� 2 ) C�H� Van Rhee/L�C� Winkel, Een Romeinsrechtelijke coryfee, Rechtshistorici uit de Lage Landen (11): Interview met Hans Ankum, in: Pro Memorie: Bijdra- ZRG RA 131 (2014) argumentation to Roman law� Both Ankum and Kennedy are reticent about this thought process, just as their Roman predecessors 3 )� It is generally acknowledged that the Roman jurists were primarily practice-orientated 4 ) and the only theoretical or philosophical works are by the "renaissance man" of Rome, Cicero�
Modern literature on legal argumentation is copious, but this paper does not enter into this specialised debate, neither into the discussions about Greek philosophy 5 ), science 6 ), philosophy of science or the Roman or modern understanding, absorption and modification of the above 7 )� The question whether law is an art, a science, a technique or a philosophy 8 ) and the variations of the status theory will be left to your own imagination 9 )� gen tot de rechtsgeschiedenis der Nederlanden 12 (2010), 146-167 at 164: "Als je mij vraagt wat de relevantie is van het Romeinse recht, dan zou ik zeggen: leren denken�" 3 ) N � Benke, In sola prudentium interpretatione, Zu Methodik und Methodologie römischer Juristen, in: B � Feldner/N � Forgó (eds�), Norm und Entscheidung, Prolegomena zu einer Theorie des Falls, Wien 2000, 1-85, at 75-82 explains this lack of information on methodology as a policy to control and retain a monopoly� 4 ) P� Stein, Interpretation and legal reasoning in Roman law, in: Chicago-Kent Law Review 70 (1994/5), 1539-1556 at 1539� 5 ) A recurring argument in the discourse on Roman methodology is that the adherents of diverging opinions have misunderstood Aristotle� Cf� W� Waldstein, Topik und Intuition in der römischen Rechtswissenschaft, in: F� Horak/W� Waldstein (eds�), Festgabe für Arnold Herdlitczka, 1972, 237-263 at 245� 6 ) For a concise introduction in theory of science see F� Horak, Rationes decidendi, Entscheidungbegründungen bei den älteren römischen Juristen bis Labeo, 1969, 9-22� Cf� Th� Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz, Ein Beitrag zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung, 1953; Benke (n� 3); and K � Riesenhuber, English common law versus German Systemdenken? Internal versus external approaches, in: Utrecht Law Review 1 (2011) 117-130 for alternative ideas� 7 ) Quint� inst� 3,11,21: Verum haec adfectata subtilitas circa nomina rerum ambi tiose laborat� 8 ) Horak, Rationes (n� 6) 23ff�, adresses the problem and refers to literature� At 34f� he mentions that in spite of all criticism Kelsen's Reine Rechtslehre remains the only scientific legal theory; also 25 for the attitude of jurists� Cf� also J � Hengstl, Gab es Rechtswissenschaft in der außerrömischen Antike?, in: R � van den Bergh/ G � van Niekerk (eds�), Libellus ad Thomasium, Essays in Roman law, Roman-Dutch law and Legal History in honour of Philip J� Thomas, Pretoria 2010, 164-183 ; Benke (n� 3) passim; D � van der Merwe, Regsmetodologie; 'n Terreinverkenning in historiese perspektief, in: Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg [TSAR] 1 (1987) ZRG RA 131 (2014) The topic of this essay is the origin of legal argumentation in Roman law and a warming-up of the hypothesis proposed by Stroux and Viehweg that the methodology of legal argument in Roman law derived from rhetoric; the response of prominent Romanists will be addressed; which necessitates a short review of the position of the Roman jurist, while the didactic myth of the correct legal solution is given some attention� 2� Alternative narratives of the development of Roman law, legal argumentation and legal science:
It remains a baffling question how the legal system in which a person who instituted an action because his vines had been cut, would lose his case because the text of the Twelve Tables stipulated trees  10 ) , developed into what Celsus described as the ars boni et aequi 11 )� This question was addressed in 1926 by Johannes Stroux 12 ), professor of classical philology at the University of Munich� He found the answer in the status theory in Greek rhetoric 13 ) and argued that when the old formalistic paradigm in Roman law was challenged by new ideas 14 ), rhetoric offered a fully developed theory and terminology� This happened because rhetoric had become the one and only study for upper-class Romans 15 ), so every politician, jurist, advocate or general, not only in preparing a speech, but in addressing any problem, would fall back on the only available theory providing him with arguments pro and contra� Stroux concentrated on issuespotting 16 ) and showed that within rhetoric the theory of interpretation of statutes 17 ) provided a variety of different angles of approach, viewpoints and knows that the main issue (or what they call it) and the legal question and the point on which the judge must decide are all identical� 10 ) Gaius inst� 4,11; also 4,30� 11 ) D� 1,1,1 pr� Waldstein (n� 5) at 260 n� 114 mentions that Beseler considered the whole text an interpolation, rhetoric, full of ethics, but more in the style of the fathers of the church than of classical jurists� 12 ) J � Stroux, Summum Ius Summa Iniuria, Ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte der interpretatio iuris, in: Festschrift Paul Speiser-Sarasin (1926); cited from reprint in J � Stroux, Römische Rechtswissenschaft und Rhetorik, Potsdam 1949, 9-66� 13 ) Stroux 1949 (n� 12) at 23f� takes one step back and speculates how from the raw material of a case the legal question is formulated� 14 ) Stroux 1949 (n� 12) 10f� 15 ) At 25� 16 ) Kennedy (n� 1) at 42: "issue spotting," which means identifying the ways in which the rules are ambiguous, in conflict, or have a gap when applied to particular fact situations� 17 ) Stroux (n� 12) at 27ff� summarises the rhetorical theory of interpretation:
arguments, topoi or topica 18 )� Since both sides of the question are to be argued, a dialectic process of argument and counterargument prepared for legal argument� Stroux referred to the cause célèbre of the causa Curiana and Cicero's Pro Caecina to prove his point 19 )� The emphasis of his essay fell on the introduction of the rhetorical status ex voluntate contra scriptum into legal interpretation and the resulting development of equity in Roman law 20 ); however, the message of Stroux's proposition is that the old paradigm in Roman law was confronted by modern ideas on equity, and that the theory and methodology of the new paradigm derived from Greek rhetoric� In this theory τóποι provided arguments for both sides; a clear distinction was made between the individual case and the abstract question 21 ), and the status theory offered a method to analyse legal problems in order to prepare argumentation 22 ZRG RA 131 (2014) Rome 39 )� His Roman jurists were also opposed to Greek pedagogics 40 ), did not teach, did not appear in court, were not interested in natural law, legal history, methodology, comparative law, philosophical speculations about justice nor a sociological approach 41 )� In consequence, their responsa were both authoritarian and authoritative 42 )� Schulz grants that the advocates adopted rhetoric theory and its topoi to use in court, but held that this had no relationship with Roman law or legal science 43 ) and that the Roman lawyers could learn nothing from rhetoric 44 )� As late as 1967 Wieacker 45 ) criticised Stroux for not having understood the legal question of the causa Curiana 46 )� Wieacker misinterpreted Stroux's conclusions 47 ) and argued that this case had been decided incorrectly 48 )� To support this opinion he reviewed a number of texts 49 ) and in doing so proved Stroux's major assertment to be correct, namely that Greek rhetoric provided a theory and technology for legal argumentation; that the topics provide arguments for both sides and that the Roman jurists utilised these in accordance with the circumstances and requirements of their cases� Meanwhile, Theodor Viehweg had provided new impetus to the topoi theory 50 )� He distinguished between topical, problem-orientated argumentation as opposed to axiomatic, systematic-deductive legal reasoning� This proposition 39 ) Gell� 15,11,1; Horak, Statuslehre (n� 22) at 121 n� 4� 40 ) At 68� 41 ) At 69, 84ff� 42 ) At 72f� 43 ) At 86: "Mit der griechischen Rhetorik aber haben sie (die Gerichtsredner) auch gewisse τόποι der griechischen Rechtsphilosophie übernommen: ius naturae und ius civile, ius gentium und ius civile, ius scriptum und ius non scriptum, lex und mos als species des ius, ius und aequitas� Das alles ist griechischer Import, von dem die rö-mischen Gerichtsredner zwar praktischen Gebrauch machen, der aber mit römischem Recht und römischer Rechtswissenschaft nichts zu tun hat�" 44 ) At 93: "Aus alledem ergibt sich: Die römischen iurisconsulti konnten hier von der Rhetorik schlechthin gar nichts lernen�" 45 ) Wieacker (n� 19)� 46 ) At 156f� 47 ) At 155: From this alleged victory of higher justice over old-fashioned clinging to words Stroux drew the far-reaching conclusion that jurists were able to find true justice merely through rhetorical education� 48 ) 156-161� He rejects the implication that Coponius would have wanted Curius to inherit if no son was born� His version of Scaevola's argumentation is largely based on probabilities� 49 ) D� 28, 6, 4 pr�; D� 26, 2, 33; D� 32, 100; D� 28, 5, 70; D� 30, 63; D� 50, 16, 122; D� 30, ) Viehweg (n� 6) passim� was inspired by Vico 51 ), and Viehweg placed the origin and development in Aristotle 52 ), Cicero 53 ) and Roman law 54 )� This allowed modern legal theorists to relegate Viehweg's work to legal history, and legal historians to consider it legal theory 55 )� After initial positive reception by Romanists 56 ), reservations were expressed� Kaser 57 ) divided (Western) jurisdictions into the system-based European codifications and the Anglo-American case law 58 )� He sketched Viehweg's thesis that different jurisdictions have other methodologies and agreed that a topical, problem-orientated argumentation is prima facie the methodology for case law� However, Kaser's analysis of the Roman sources led him to conclude that the Roman jurists found and developed their law not by way of rational argument, but that their intuition was the way to the correct legal answer 59 )� As arguments Kaser presented the sensus iu 51 ) G�B� Vico, De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, Napoli 1708� Viehweg (n� 6) 4f� views the leading idea of this work a distinction between two scientific methods, which he typifies as the old rhetoric or topical and the new critical methods, the first transferred by Cicero, the second named after Descartes (not mentioned by Vico, who referred to Arnauld instead)� Vico expressed a preference for the old method� 52 ) Viehweg (n� 6) at 6-10 places topoi within the context of Aristotle's work, namely in dialectics, as a method to reach conclusions for any problem on the basis of propositions, which appear true to most people or to the wise or to the majority or the most respected of the latter group� 53 ) At 10-14 he mentions the circumstances of Cicero's Topica as well as the fact that this work, in spite of the lower standard and absence of philosophical content, has had more influence than Aristotle's work of the same title� 54 ZRG RA 131 (2014) ridicus, which evolved into a genius for juristic ethics of the Roman people 60 ), Roman realism, traditionalism, the fact that the republican Roman jurists belonged to a small ruling class, and finally experience 61 )� He acknowledged that during the second century BC demands for rational motivation of the responsa may have played a role 62 ), but held that this was temporary as the practice-orientated Roman lawyers felt no need for theory 63 )� Kaser also distinguished between lawyers and rhetors on the basis of their objectives: the rhetor strived for success in court, using topoi from all walks of life 64 ), but the Roman jurists moved on a higher ethical plane and aimed for the realisation of justice 65 )� Allowing for some Greek influence during the second century BC Kaser believed that Schulz exaggerated 66 ) and that the interpolationists had shown that many regulae, definitiones, distinctiones and differentiae in the Digest were of Byzantine origin 67 )� He concluded that the Romans had developed a highly sophisticated juristic instrumentarium, superior to any topoi catalogue, as well as an internal system 68 ), but granted a difference between the Pandektists and the Roman approach 69 (2009) 20, 28ff� cited by Riesenhuber (n� 6) at 126: "A systematic approach is what Hesselink has recently described as an internal perspective as opposed to an external perspective of the law …"� At 124 Riesenhuber had stated: "As the example of Roman law illustrates, a case law approach can, at the same time, be systematic�" For this pearl he relied on J�D� Harke, Juristenmethode in Rom, in: K � Riesenhuber (ed�), Europäische Methodenlehre, 2010, § 2� At 30 Riesenhuber concludes: "While the common law tradition and the continental legal systems differ substantially with regard to the sources of the law, it is submitted that they do not differ as much with regard to the methods for finding the law� A case-by-case approach proceeds by analogy or distinction and is no less concerned with equality or coherence than a systematic approach on the basis of codified law� Both, common lawyers and civil lawyers have in common that they pursue internal approaches to the law�" 69 ) At 77�
In Rationes decidendi 70 ), an analysis of the grounds for the decisions of the Roman jurists until Labeo 71 ), Hora k made a learned contribution to the discourse� He included a preliminary on science 72 ), but found little consensus� Nevertheless, Horak deduced certain basic requirements, such as the necessity of a system 73 ) and rational justification 74 )� He argued that no material differences exist between natural and human sciences and that in reality no science consists of only one system, but of a plurality of component systems� He differentiated between discovery and justification, acknowledging the role of intuition in the first 75 ), but not in the latter 76 )� His insistence on system, rationality, method, logical analysis and argumentation made him reject the opinions of Vico and Viehweg 77 )� This same persistence made him distinguish between "Rechtswissenschaft" and "Rechtspolitik" 78 ) and refer to the pseudo-scientific methods of legal science 79 )� 88 ) At 133 van der Merwe translates Aristotle's topoi as points of view and then interprets topos as a strategy for presentation of an argument, which in most cases is build upon a principle� Cicero's locus, the seat of an argument, becomes an argument at 139 and in Boethius' version of the theory of topoi; topos is described as a maxima propositio, an obvious and fundamental truth, see 142� At 146ff� the medieval view on topoi as arguments and the synthesis of Everardus' Topica seu de locis legalibus is followed by the humanist scientific systematising and the reversal of importance of loci by the development of principia iuris of axiomata� 89 ) Van der Merwe (n� 8) 133 refers to dialectics as the art of arts and the science of sciences� 90 ) Top� 2� See also 10 where Cicero describes the use of similarities and compari-to Schulz 91 ) and Viehweg, but their interpretations differ� In the same manner Horak remarked on the different ideas about science 92 ), while Waldstein mentioned the intellectual and methodical variety within Greek philosophy 93 )� 3�2� Greek influence: The influence of Greek culture on Roman society, in particular during the two centuries after the second Punic war, is commonplace and Roman law was not immune 94 )� However, the debate which school of philosophy, at a given period and in which Roman circles was influential in Rome, is far from concluded� Winkel has warned against hasty conclusions and stated that a distinction should be made between philosophical and rhetorical influences 95 )� Kaser believed that this influence should not be over-estimated 96 )� It is submitted that there appears to be a paradox when authors, who make the practicality and practice-orientation of the Roman jurists an a priori, also pretend that Greek dialectics -be it in Aristotelian or Stoic form 97 ) -seriously influenced the development of Roman law� It should be noted that near the end of his life, the well-educated, intelligent and hard-working Cicero appears to have had only vague knowledge of Aristotle's Topoi 98 ) and that his philosophy was rather mix and match 99 )� However, to denigrate and selectively ignore Cicero 100 ), and to profess the belief that the Roman jurists, these so-called men son to reach a conclusion by way of induction, the favorite method 101 ) is an inconsistency� That practical lawyers would make use of topoi, for which they had immediate, practical application seems more probable� 3�3� System: It is trite that the humanists were the first to systematise (Roman) law, albeit for didactic purposes 102 )� The seventeenth century scientific revolution resulted in a general paradigm shift as observed and deplored by Vico� Natural lawyers drew inspiration from Descartes, Spinoza and similar thinkers and strived to mathematise and rationalise law� This Euclidean Idealtypus of a closed system with logical deduction 103 ) was expected to be realised in codification� During the nineteenth century the Pandectists carried the torch� Tuori 104 ) has traced how the scientific beginnings of Roman law were invented to trump the claims of the Germanists 105 )� The resulting narrative described the history of Roman law as the development of legal science and the concomitant system� The interpolationists were the logical consequence, and it should be kept in mind that the system builders and deductive reasoners are still active 106 )� However, Quintilian already explained that if it were always possible to solve disputed questions from generally admitted premises, the advocate would be of little use 107 )� the reverence of Tully has ebbed, although the nadir of his reputation when he was represented as a mere translator and simplifier of Greek culture without a grain of originality has been passed� Cf� Marcia Colish, The Stoic tradition from Antiquity to the early Middle Ages, Leiden 1985, l, 65-152 ZRG RA 131 (2014) Kaser 108 ) depicted Viehweg's division of legal systems and legal thinking as absolute, an either-or, and remarked that even topical argumentation cannot do without deduction and that even case-built jurisdictions have an internal system 109 )� Van der Merwe 110 ) pragmatically summarised the influence of dialectics in Roman law in that the tentative steps of Scaevola 111 ), taken up by Sabinus culminated in the institutional system of Gaius, a tool in legal education, but hardly a coherent legal system� 3�4� The correct legal solution: Duncan Kennedy tells how first-year American law students are introduced to a so-called hot and cold case� The first case involves a sympathetic plaintiff and an unsympathetic defendant, for example an Appalachian farm family and a coal company� The latter had rented the farmer's land for strip mining with the promise to restore it to its original condition once the coal had been mined� The company reneged on this promise and the court awarded a few hundred dollars instead of ordering the restoration work� The student is taught that her initial reaction is naïve, non-legal, irrelevant and wrong; that there are good reasons for the decision, when you take a legal and logical large view 112 )� The legal argumentation is never explicitly explained, but leads to the correct legal solution�
The authority of Kaser is such that his essay on the method of the Roman jurists has hardly ever been questioned� However, both Horak and Waldstein have suggested that intuition may have helped Roman lawyers to find a solution and arguments, but cannot replace legal argumentation� Moreover, the idea that there is one correct legal solution does not convince today� In Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 113 ) Waldstein 114 ) has provided scientific objections, but one simple criticism is that approval of Kaser's proposition implies intuitive acceptance of the Roman legal solution by the reader� This is a variation on the chicken and egg conundrum, since until recently 108 ) Kaser (n� 55)� 109 ) At 50-53� 110 ) At 135-139� 111 ) Quintus Mucius Scaevola (ob� 82 BC)� Cf� D� 1,2,2,41; Stein (n� 4) at 1544� 112 ) At 41: "if you can't muster those reasons, maybe you aren't cut out to be a lawyer"� 113 ) H � Temporini/W� Haase (eds�), Aufstieg und Niedergand der römischen Welt, Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung, Berlin 1976, vol� II 15 Principat� 114 ) W� Waldstein, Entscheidungsgrundlagen der klassischen römischen Juristen, in: Temporini/Haase (n� 113) 3-100 at 4-10� all jurists started their studies with a healthy dose of Roman law to lay the foundation of their legal knowledge and instil the art of legal reasoning� In consequence, the proposition that the Roman legal solutions are correct would in the recent past hardly be met with opposition 115 )� However, Max Weber and the popularisation of the ideas of the Frankfurter School after 1968 have placed different values and interests in society within the scientific debate 116 )� This has placed the correct legal solution in a subjective cultural context� The subtext of Duncan Kennedy's essay is that 'thinking like a lawyer' means that virtually any solution can be argued in an acceptable manner 117 ), refuting the distinction between jurists and barristers 118 )� Bydlinski has also argued that in virtually every serious legal problem both sides can raise good legal arguments 119 ), and that the outcome of a legal problem is co-determined by a variety of factors� It is nowhere denied that a large part of legal disputes is solved by simple deduction from an uncontested rule 120 ), but this paper attends to those cases in which for both sides good 118 ) The barristers using all including questionable means and arguments from all walks of life to win their case, while the jurists are only interested in the realisation of material justice; Kaser (n� 55) at 67, 73� 119 ) Bydlinski (n� 76) at 28f� where he also holds: "Tatsächlich geht es in der Jurisprudenz, wie sie praktisch betrieben wird und betrieben werden muss, weithin um die Erarbeitung und Abwägung von Rechtsgewinnungsargumenten, die ergeben, dass die eine der möglichen Problemlösungen rechtlich vorzuziehen ist, weil sie relative besser dem Recht (den vorfindlichen Rechtsnormen und dem vorfindlichen sonstigen Rechtsgewinnungsmaterial) entspricht�" 120 ) Bydlinski (n� 76) at 29: "Nur in einem zwar durchaus relevanten, aber eben unproblematischen Bereich routinemäßiger Rechtsanwendung führt bereits bloße de-arguments can be raised and investigates the hypothesis that the oratorical training of the educated Roman during the late republic determined legal argumentation, in other words created the mould for 'thinking like a lawyer'� Kaser's argument 121 ) that many of the regulae, definitiones, disctinctiones and differentiae in the Digest have been shown to have been interpolations by Byzantine post-classical law schools belongs to an earlier paradigm, while his argument that there were many more controversiae than we are aware of, since both Gaius and Justinian deleted much 122 ), is grain on the mill of Viehweg� 3�5� Idealised version of Roman jurists: Wieacker's description of Scaevola is classic: an old aristocratic jurist, who as a rule stood as an impartial adviser above the parties� His cousin, the augur looked down with amused contempt on the juristic ignorance of the average court speaker 123 )� Wieacker considered the cryptic rationes decidendi an expression of tact mellowed through long experience 124 )� Kaser's admiration of the Roman jurist shows throughout his work and he describes the lawyerswho by the way were foremost politicians -as the standard-bearers of high ethics 125 ), not interested in winning cases in court, but striving for the realisation of justice 126 )� This vision results in minimising the influence of topics, rhetoric, dialectics or logic in the development of Roman law� The arguments that the Romans had exceptional talent for justice 127 ) and that the Roman jurists originally belonged to a small ruling class, which was a safeguard against duktive Ableitung aus den vorfindlichen Rechtsnormen zu eindeutigen und zureichenden Ergebnissen� Es ist der Grundfehler der üblichen rechtspositivistischen Ansätze, daß sie nur diesen Bereich und darüber hinaus nur die rechtlich freie Entscheidung des zuständigen Rechtsorgans kennen und kunstvoll alle argumentative Rechtsgewinnung dazwischen wegdefinieren�" 121 ) At 71� 122 ) At 75� 123 ) Wieacker (n� 19) at 157f� 124 ) At 164: "insofar as the jurists give any reasons for their decisions at all, all we have is mostly a short apercu; a reflection upon the general theory of the exegesis we find only in the writings of Celsus unique� This was neither old-fashionedness nor superficial pragmatism on the part of those great jurists, but tact mellowed through long experience�" Wieacker believed the topics too clumsy to offer criteria needed for a balanced evaluation of the interests involved and held that at most they may give an approximate idea of the possible points of view� 125 ) At 67� 126 ) At 73� 127 ) Contra Horak, Rationes (n� 6) 1 who quotes from Mommsen's inaugural lecture in Zürich (1852) to the same effect� subjectivity 128 ), are also questionable� Horak remarked that the idealised image of the Roman jurists should be adapted to a more realistic world-view and queried whether the lawyers' ethics were indeed so much better than those of the advocates 129 )� Winkel has referred to Kop in the same vein 130 )� 3�6� Isolation of Roman law and resulting pole position: It has been argued that Roman law was not open to these foreign influences on account of the closed circle of jurists and the self-sufficient nature of Roman law 131 )� This conviction is essential to support other beliefs, namely the idea that Roman legal science is the origin of modern legal science 132 ); that Roman law was ratio scripta, and the autonomy of law 133 )� The latter is the fiction that law, from Roman law onwards at least, is separate from society, an idyllic, rational island irrespective of the surrounding world 134 )� Thus, injustice has no
128 ) The fact of the small closed group, brought to the fore by Schulz (n� 27) at 27ff� and 70ff� ("Honoratiorenjurisprudenz") has as many cons as it has pros� It may be realistic to give attention to the authoritarian attitude of this group and the corruption concomitant with a closed oligarchy, for which argument ample support is to be found in Roman literary sources� 129 ) At 122� Winkel (n� 95) at 68: "Nachdem [i�e� Wieacker 1950 and 1969] inzwischen einige Versuche unternommen wurden, nachzuweisen, dass diese Idealisierung der Juristen als eines besonderen Berufstandes im Grunde ein unhistorisches Vorurteil war�" A possible origin of this idolising may be found in the work of von Savigny� Cf� G � Schmid, Review of Traité de la Possession (French translation of Das Recht des Besitzes), in: Louisiana Law Journal 1 (1841) 46 at 59: "The author [i�e� von Savigny], intimately acquainted with ancient Rome … seems to entertain for everything appertaining to this ancient Mistress of the world a veneration which forbids him even to examine the justice and expediency of the principles of her legislation and still less to doubt the fairness and propriety"� Gustav Schmid was a leading Louisiana jurist who published The Civil law of Spain and Mexico (1851) and was the founder of the Louisiana Law Journal� 130 ) At 68 (n� 12) he refers to P� C � Kop, Beschouwingen over het zgn� 'vulgaire' Romeinse Recht, Leiden 1981, passim� 131 ) Schulz (n� 27) at 84ff� describes the boundaries of Roman jurisprudence, which meant that philosophy, methodology, legal history and comparative law were kept outside legal science; Horak, Rationes (n� 6) 48: "Aber der römische Jurist scheint zu sehr in den Schranken seines Fachs befangen gewesen zu sein, als daß er so Ungewohntes hätte in seine Wissenschaft integrieren können"; Kaser (n� 55) at 67 even held against rhetoric that topoi from all walks of life were used� 132 ) Tuori (n� 28) at 21-69 for the competing genealogies of Western legal science� References to the opinions of the authors cited in this paper, but also to Senn, La Pira, in the ideas of bonum et aequum and bona fides and that an independent juristic technique developed, which made it possible to solve social conflicts according to a rational intellectual rule 142 )� He admitted that juristic argumentation had seldom been investigated� Kaser acknowledged that during the second century B�C� the jurists appeared in court alongside the rhetors, which led to demands for rational motivation 143 ); this rational method was topical, that is searching for arguments to solve a case� Where the rational method was present, namely in topical argumentation, the search for topics and arguments was guided by intuition� Thus Kaser agreed that jurisprudence and rhetoric shared a methodology 144 ), and many of the arguments used by the Roman lawyers described by him 145 ) and the associative thinking he referred to 146 ), are the topoi of Cicero and Viehweg� Horak's findings on the rationes decidendi raise the question regarding the exact difference between Cicero's and Viehweg's topica and Horak's types 147 )� 5� Conclusion: Stroux was criticised for not being a lawyer 148 ), but it can be argued that this so-called weakness in effect was a strong point� He was not integrated in and indoctrinated by 20 th century legal science and thus stood outside the ruling dogma� Stroux's thesis that Greek rhetoric led to the adoption of a system for free interpretation of statutes and documents was contrary to the beliefs of the ruling paradigm 149 )� The retort that he overestimated the importance of the causa Curiana and that this case was wrongly decided 150 ) does not invalidate his argument� Viehweg took as point of departure that legal argumentation in case law jurisdictions differs from that in codified legal systems� His theory distinguished between problem-orientated argumentation making use of topics as opposed to systematic-deductive legal reasoning using axioms; whether he misunderstood Aristotle is also immaterial 151 )� 142 ) At 151� 143 ) At 58� 144 ) At 67� 145 ) At 59 he mentions analogy, e contrario, regulae� 146 ) At 69f�; also Benke (n� 3) 30ff� 147 ) At 78ff� 148 ) Wieacker (n� 19) at 157� 149 ) Cf� Jolowicz (n� 26) at 576f�; Tellegen-Couperus, Quintilian (n� 26) at 167ff� 150 ) Wieacker (n� 19) at 161� 151 ) Horak, Rationes (n� 6) 45-65� The latter acknowledges the influence of Cicero's Topica in Roman law, but denigrates this as "Rechtspolitik", which falls outside his dogmatic and outdated concept of "Rechtswissenschaft"� For example at 48: ZRG RA 131 (2014) It is submitted that on the basis of the zone of possible agreement, Kaser's methodology could be updated and adapted� If the role of intuition is placed in the context of discovery 152 ), as a guide in the search for arguments, topoi, and his image of the Roman lawyer is brought down-to-earth, his analysis of the methodology of the Roman lawyers would show that thinking like a Roman lawyer consists in problem orientated, topical legal argumentation� The seminal importance of Kaser's essay is found in his emphasis on the absence of absolutes, so that in all legal orders deduction and induction operate side by side; that both are rational methods and that the topoi in Roman law were not limited to the regulae of D� 50,17� However, Kaser's objection that in rhetoric topoi from all aspects of life were used, should be ignored� Exactly this point opened the possibility to take political and socio-economic arguments into consideration, which resulted in the many controversiae� I would like to conclude by mentioning the observation of Tomasz Giaro 153 ) namely that the Roman jurists did not care whether their work was scientific or not, and that the obsession to prove the scientific nature of Roman jurisprudence is anachronistic neo-positivism� "Schließlich gibt es in dem Büchlein [= Cicero's Topica] so manches an Argumentationslehre, was spätere Jurisprudenz ausgiebig verwendet hat und heute noch verwendet� Aber der römische Jurist scheint zu sehr in den Schranken seines Fachs befangen gewesen zu sein, als daß er so Ungewohntes hätte in seine Wissenschaft integrieren können�" 152 ) Horak, Rationes (n� 6) 43: "Auch in der Jurisprudenz hat daher Intuition ihren Platz bei Entdeckung, nicht aber bei Begründung von Entscheidungen�" 153 ) T� Giaro, Die Illusion der Wissenschaftlichkeit, Index 22 (1994) 118-128�
